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COMMENTS
MEETING COMPETITION UNDER
SALES BELOW COST STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION

This Comment examines the defense of meeting competition under
statutes in force in a majority of jurisdictions which prohibit sales
below cost for the purpose of injuring a competitor or destroying
competition. 1 The statutes have been aimed primarily at the institutional practice of "loss leader"' selling in the retail grocery industry; hence, the statutes will be examined in that light. Examination

will be made of reported cases at the trial and appellate levels and
of opinions of attorneys general. A comparison with federal cases
arising under the various federal antitrust laws will be made where
helpful.
The statutes apply generally to wholesalers and retailers and prohibit selling below cost with the intent to injure a competitor or destroy competition, if the result would be to lessen competition substantially. In many states, the effect of injuring a competitor is made
an alternative to the requirement of intent to injure as an element
of the violation.'
The statutes generally attempt to define cost as the lower of invoice cost or replacement cost, plus cartage (if paid for by the merchant), state and federal taxes, a presumed markup to cover the
cost of doing business (usually six per cent), and less trade discounts (except discounts for the prompt payment of cash). The
standard is, of course, artificial, since it requires that each product
bear the same proportion of the cost of doing business despite differences in the cost of displaying and packaging different products,
and because it makes the markup a percentage of invoice cost although it is usually expressed as a percentage of gross sales.' Other
objections could be urged; for example, a merchant who is able to
prove that he has a lower cost is not required to use the statutory
formula, but as a practical matter very few merchants go to the
'A

complete compilation

is found in 2 CCH

Trade

Reg.

Rep.
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ed.)

55

10000-I5RS (1958).
""Loss leader" selling in the retail grocery industry is the practice of advertising
and selling certain products at a low price, usually below, retailer's cost, in order to
attract customers and increase the volume of business.
3See note 36 infra for an "intent or effect" clause.
'See Clark, Statutory Restrictions on Selling Below Cost, 11 Vand. L. Rev. 105,
119-125 (1957).
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trouble and expense of computing their actual cost on specific items.
This Comment uses the word "cost" in the statutory sense, that is,
cost as computed under the statutory formula.
There are three types of sanctions provided for by the statutes:
one may sue for damages as a result of being injured by the unlawful practices of his competitor; 5 he may seek an injunction against
his competitor for selling below cost in violation of the act;' or the
state may bring criminal action against a violator.! Injunction seems
to be the popular remedy.!
In all but three states" having below cost legislation, an exception
is made permitting a merchant to cut his price below his cost in
order to meet competition. This exception is granted upon three
conditions: (1) some statutes permit a merchant to sell below cost
"in good faith to meet the prices of a competitor"" (subsequently
referred to as "meeting competition" statutes) ; (2) others permit
a merchant to sell below cost "in good faith to meet the legal prices
of a competitor"' 1 (subsequently referred to as "legal price" statutes); and (3) the Oklahoma statute permits a merchant to sell
below cost "in good faith to meet the price of a competitor who is
selling .. .at cost to him . . .. "
II.

NATURE OF THE STATUTORY EXCEPTION

A. Meeting Competition Statutes
In the states which allow the meeting of a price without reference to its legality, the term "good faith" means that a merchant
'See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Laws ch. 205, S 11 (1955).
6ldaho Code Ann. 5 48-406 (1947).
7
N.D. Rev. Code 5 51-1005 (1943).
$An examination of the casesreveals that in most instances the plaintiff sought an
injunction against the defendant.
aNamely, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.
1"Idaho Code Ann. § 48-407 (1947). Kansas also has the exception worded in this
form. The Arizona, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin
statutes word the exception as follows: "a price made in good faith to meet competition."
The Arizona statute was declared unconstitutional in part in State v. Walgreen Drug Co.,
57 Ariz. 308, 113 P.2d 650 (1941); the Maryland statute was declared unconstitutional
in Cohen v. Frey & Son, 197 Md. 586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951).
" Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-6(4) (1953). California, Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming word the statute in this manner. The New Jersey statute was
declared unconstitutional in State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A.2d
291 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1939). The Colorado statute was apparently declared unconstitutional
by a Colorado district court in Standard Store v. Safeway Stores, CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
(1955 Trade Cas.) 5 68153, at 70740 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 5, 1955); no subsequent
history of this case has been found. Maine, New Hampshire, and North Dakota phrase
the exception to read "in good faith to meet legal competition." The Maine statute was
declared unconstitutional in part in Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 151 Me. 400, 120
A.2d 289 (1956). Virginia uses the term "lawful competition."
"aOkla. Stat. tit. 15, § 598.7 (1951).
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must intend to meet the price of his competitor. For example, in
Kansas v. Contmcrcial Candy Co., 1" the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the defendants from selling below cost. The defendants answered
that their competitors were selling at the price complained of by
the plaintiff. The supreme court reversed the judgment for plaintiff, stating that while the defendants had the burden of proving
facts entitling them to the benefit of the exception, this meant that
they must prove simply "that they made the sales in question in
good faith to meet the price of a competitor in the same locality,"' 4
and were not required to show that the price they were attempting
to meet was itself legal. In accord is Cohen v. Frey & Son," in which
the court stated that the word "legal" was omitted from the statute
and the court could not insert it.
B. Legal Price Statutes
Under this type exception, the initial question is whether a merchant can take advantage of the good-faith exception when he
knows that the price he is meeting is an illegal one. The Attorney
General of Utah has stated that the good-faith exception is not available to one selling below cost if he knows that his competitor's price
is unlawful, for in such instances he will not be endeavoring "in
good faith to meet the legal prices of a competitor."'" And the Oklahoma Supreme Court in a recent case denied use of the good-faith
exception by Safeway Stores because it set prices "for the sole purpose of meeting prices . ..which it thought to be illegal."" Thus,
it would seem that in the legal price statutes, the phrase initially
means that the merchant must believe that the price he is meeting
is a legal one.
The statutes declare a price illegal when set with the intent to
"166 Kan. 432, 201 P.2d 1034 (1949).
14201 P.2d at 1039.
" 197 Md. 586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951). This should be contrasted with the approach
taken by the Maryland Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in Obrecht v. Kotzin,
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1950-1951 Trade Cas.) 5 62694, at 64017, 64018 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 28, 1950), where the court stated that "If one distributor can lower his price and
keep it lowered just because another does, or others do, then we have a vicious circle
where everyone lowers his prices to meet the competition of others, and the law becomes
unenforceable. . . . While the word 'legal' is not in the exception on which the defendant
relies, I think it is implicit that the competition therein referred to is 'legal competition'
... " The problem is now moot in Maryland because the court in the Cohen case
declared the statute unconstitutional because of the indefinite nature of the cost provisions.
"6Op. Att'y Gen. of Utah, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1952-1953 Trade Cas.) 5 67410,
at 68079 (Dec. 31, 1952).
"Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 322 P.2d 179, 181 (Okla.
1957). Although Oklahoma is not a "legal price" state, the interpretation of its goodfaith exception in this respect, would be the same as in the legal price states. See text. on
the Oklahoma statute infra.
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injure a competitor or destroy competition. Therefore, since a merchant in a legal-price state may meet only a price which he believes
is a legal one, the interpretation of the phrase "intent to injure" is
of first importance. To date, the courts which have discussed the
matter have seriously divided as to its meaning. Thus, in Sandler v.
Gordon, 8 the court found that the plaintiff had sold below cost. The
plaintiff testified that his purpose was to increase his business and
that he did not care from whom he got the business. The court held
that this evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption that the
plaintiff's sales were made for the purpose of injuring a competitor
or destroying competition. In Henderson v. Hogue," the court held
that the defendant had not violated a Tennessee milk act simply
because he used milk as a loss leader for the purpose of attracting
customers. And in Ellis v. Dallas," the trial court found that the
defendant had made sales below cost for the purpose of inducing,
promoting, and encouraging the purchase of other merchandise, but
not for the purpose of injuring plaintiffs or destroying competition.
In Serrer v. Cigarette Serv. Co., 1 however, the defendants indiscriminately sent cards to their retailers advertising the defendants'
prices. The court stated that this showed an intent to procure business from other wholesalers (not just to retain customers), and thus
to injure competitors. In accord with this approach is Dikeou v.
Food DistributorsAss'n, which held that the defendants had violated
the Colorado statute because "it may be presumed in a civil action
that the natural and probable consequences of the act were intended
by the actor.""

The statement just quoted points up the essential conflict between
those cases which find an intent to injure and those which do not,
for if a merchant intends to increase his business, he knows he must
do so at the expense of his competitors, assuming relative inelasticity
of demand in the industry. Consequently, under the Dikeou approach, if he is successful in increasing his own business he had the
intent to injure because he presumably intended the reasonable consequences of his act. Under the approach of the Sandier case, however, it is a specific intent to injure which the statute requires.
The effect of the Dikeou approach is to render the good-faith
1894 Cal. App. 2d 258, 210 P.2d 314

(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
'9CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1956 Trade Cas.) 5 68462, at 71933 (Tenn. Dist. Ct. App.
Aug. 23, 1956).
20 113 Cal. App. 2d 234, 248 P.2d 63 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
"'74 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1946), aff'd, 74 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio Ct. App.),
aff'd, 148 Ohio St. 519, 76 N.E.2d 91 (1947).
12107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529 (1940).
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exception meaningless, since any merchant who reduces his prices
below cost "intends" to injure his competitor, and a competitor who
loses volume as a result of the price cut cannot meet his competitor's
below-cost price. In other words, the competitor's knowledge that
he is injured by the first merchant's below-cost sales is equivalent
to knowledge that the price to be met is illegal, and the competitor
is therefore barred from pleading good faith if he cuts his prices
to meet the lower price." Acceptance and application of the Dikeou
approach would stifle effective competition among merchants. Furthermore, in the "intent or effect" states, the phrase "or effect" is
superfluous if the Dikeou approach is used. 4
The writer believes that the better approach and the correct one
for purposes of statutory construction is recited in the Sandier case,
which held that only unfair diversion of trade is condemned and
implied that the only unfair diversion is one which has the ruination
of a competitor as its specific and primary purpose. The good-faith
exception itself becomes meaningful only when this definition of
intent is used. We may conclude, therefore, that the statutes contemplate the treatment of various intents and purposes as mutually
exclusive; that is, proof of the intent to meet competition in good
faith will negative an intent to injure a competitor or destroy competition.
Once a merchant has demonstrated that he thought he was meeting a legal price, is it of any consequence whether that price was
legal in fact? In commenting on this problem, the Supreme Court
of Washington stated that "if a merchant in good faith reduces his
prices to meet those of a competitor who he in good faith believes
has a legal price, he will not be violating either the intent or the
wording of the act."'" Under this approach, it would seem immaterial whether the price met was lawful in fact.
A contrary position was taken by the Attorney General of Utah
5

" Cf. State v. Commercial Candy Co., 166 Kan. 432, 201 P.2d 1034 (1949), where
the court stated that even if sales made by the defendant resulted in injury to other
competitors and tended to destroy competition, such sales must be made with the intent
to bring about those results to constitute a violation. If the Dikeou approach were used
in the "meeting competition" states, a merchant who lowered his price to meet his competitor's equally low price could not plead the exception if his price cut had the effect
of increasing his volume of sales since at that point, he would have the intent to injure
as the reasonable consequences of his act.
"'In a legal price state which also has an intent or effect clause, how does a merchant
ever successfully establish that he is within the exception? If his competitor's price has
the effect of injuring him, he knows that the competitor has acted illegally under the
statute. Hence, a meeting of that competitor's price is the meeting of an illegal price and
the exception is not available. The writer has found no cases reconciling this apparent
conflict in statutes of this type.
" State v. Sears, 4 Wash. 2d 200, 103 P.2d 337, 345 (1940).
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in an opinion stating that a merchant does not come within the
exemption privilege if he sells at the actual but unlawful prices of
a competitor although lacking knowledge that the competitor's
prices are unlawful. "One may endeavor to meet the 'legal' but not
the 'illegal' prices of a competitor."2 Of similar import is the statement of the Attorney General of Minnesota that a merchant wishing to take advantage of the meeting-competition defense must show
that his competitor's price is legal."
This approach seems unsound and out of harmony with the language and purpose of the statute. A merchant, of course, has the
burden of proving facts entitling him to the benefit of the exception; that is, he must prove his "good faith."28 But once this burden
is met, it would seem that the merchant has done all that he is required to do under the statute. This proposition was stated by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, contrary to the opinion of the At-

torney General, supra:
If a merchant in good faith sets the price of an article on the basis of a
competitor's price, which price he in good faith believes to be a legal
one, there is no violation."

Indeed, the very qualification of "good faith" would seem to obviate any necessity for proving the absolute legality of the competitor's price, and certainly the position taken by the two attorneys
general, previously mentioned, renders the good-faith qualification
meaningless.'" Furthermore, there are practical objections to such an
26Op. Att'y Gen. of Utah, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1952-1953 Trade Cas.)
67410,
at 68079, 68081 (Dec. 31, 1952).
7
56137,
Op. Att'y Gen. of Minn., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1940-1943 Trade Cas.)
at 542 (May 28, 1941).
2
State v. Commercial Candy Co., 166 Kan. 432, 201 P.2d 1034 (1949).
9
" State v. Wolkoff, 85 N.W.2d 401, 407 (Minn. 1957).
20 Although the statement of the Attorney General of Minnesota related to the burden
of proof, its substantive implications are clear. One who is required to prove the legality
of his competitor's price can, in effect, only meet a price which he knows is legal-a price
at or above statutory cost. Apparently, the attorneys general equated the burden of proving
good faith with the burden of proving the legality of the competitor's price (which is
not required by the statutes). Obviously, the two are not the same; a merchant can illustrate his good faith, for example, by reference to prevailing market conditions, the policy
of his particular industry, his prior knowledge of his competitor's practices, etc. As the
court stated in State v. Commercial Candy Co., 166 Kan. 432, 201 P.2d 1034 (1949),
the only sure way to determine whether a competitor is selling at cost or above is through
an examination of his books. In People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 143 P.2d 762 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1943), aff'd, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9 (1944), the court stated that a merchant may assume that the price fixed by his competitor is a legal price. While this approach is equitable and practical, it is difficult to reconcile with the section of the various
statutes which makes evidence of a sale below cost prima facie evidence of an intent to
injure a competitor or destroy competition. The approach of the California court should
be contrasted with the approach of the trial court in Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1955 Trade Cas.) 5 68195. at 70906 (Okla.
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approach. In State '. Packard-Bamberger F Co., the supreme court
made the following observation:
How a person is to determine the legality of the price of a competitor
is not declared, and the impracticability, if not the impossibility of
determining the "legality" of a competitor's price is obvious.3
C. A Procedural or Substantive Defense?
A question never directly considered by any state court is whether
the defense of meeting competition is procedural or substantive. The
statutes declare that evidence of sales below cost is prima facie evidence of the intent to injure a competitor or destroy competition,
thus shifting to the defendant the burden of proving some other
purpose sufficient to rebut that presumption. Thus, if the defense is
substantive, proof of meeting competition in good faith is sufficient
to exempt the defendant from the operation of the statute; if the
defense is procedural only, proof of meeting competition in good
faith would have only the effect of requiring the plaintiff to go forward with further proof of his allegations of unlawful pricing.
In three cases, the courts have had occasion to make statements
which indicate the trend of judicial thinking on the question. In
Cohen v. Frey & Son, the Maryland Court of Appeals states that
section 114 provides that the provisions of the act shall not apply to
sales "where the price of merchandise is set in good faith to meet competition" or in seven other enumerated cases. Manifestly, these eight
cases are not exceptions to the prohibition of sales at less than cost
with intent to injure a competitor. Section 114 is a statutory declaration that these eight cases are not to be regarded as sales with intent
to injure a competitor."'
Of similar import is the statement in State v. Wolkoff, previously
referred to:
If a merchant in good faith sets the price of an article on the basis of
a competitor's price, which price he in good faith believes to be a legal
one, there is no violation.33 (Emphasis added.)
Finally, in Kansas v. Commercial Candy Co., the court had occasion
Dist. Ct. Oct. 21, 1955), aft'd, 322 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957), where the trial court stated
that because Safeway was forced to sell below cost in order to meet competitors' prices,
it should have known that there was something wrong with the prices the competitors
were charging, since Safeway knew it could purchase cheaper than anyone else. This approach, of course, also forces the defendant to determine at his peril the legality of his
competitors' prices.
3' 123 N.J.L. 180, 185, 8 A.2d 291, 294 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1939). This case declared the
New Jersey statute unconstitutional because it required a merchant to determine absolutely
the legality of his competitor's price.
2 80 A.2d at 269.
385 N.W.2d 401, 407 (Minn.
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to remark that "even if sales by the defendant resulted in injury
to other competitors and tended to destroy competition, such sales

must be made with the intent to bring about those results to constitute a violation."34 (Emphasis added.) A fair inference from the
language in these cases is that these various state courts would hold
that the defense is substantive rather than procedural.
There is evidence in the statutes to indicate that this is the correct result. First, in those statutes which require a specific intent,
there can be no violation unless the trier of fact finds specifically
the requisite intent. Since, as stated in State v. Wolkoff, proof that
prices were set on the basis of competitors' prices "would fairly
negate any claim that the prices were established to injure competitors or destroy competition,"'" a finding of the latter fact
would in most instances preclude a finding of the former. The problem is somewhat different in those statutes which proscribe sales below cost when made with the intent or effect of injuring a competitor or destroying competition." This was the question in Standard Oil v. FTC." The Commission held that evidence that Standard
was meeting competition was irrelevant in the face of a finding that
the effect of Standard's low prices was to injure, prevent, and destroy competition. In the course of its opinion reversing the Commission, the Supreme Court stated:
The proviso in §2(b) as interpreted by the Commission, would not be
available when there was or might be an injury to competition at a
resale level. So interpreted, the proviso would have such little, if any,
applicability as to be practically meaningless. We may, therefore, conclude that Congress meant to permit the natural consequences to
follow the seller's action in meeting in good faith a lawful and equally
low price of a competitor."
Moreover, the statutes themselves afford ample evidence that in the
"intent or effect" statutes the defense is substantive rather than procedural. The statutes in these states (and in the specific intent states)
invariably set out exceptions to the operation of the act, prefacing
P.2d at 1039.
3 85 N.W.2d at 407-08.
" "Any retailer who, with intent, or effect, of injuring competitors or destroying competition, advertises, offers to sell or sells at retail any item of merchandise at less than
cost to the retailer . . . shall be fined ....
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358:2 (1955). The
intent or effect states are Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.
" 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
34201

"8Id.at 250. Technically, the issue in the Standard Oil case was whether Standard's
discriminatory pricing was exempted by the "good faith" exception in the Robinson-Patman
Act, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952), but'the legal issue is the same
as in below-cost legislation.
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the exceptions with such declarations as "the prohibitions of this
Chapter . . .do not apply to any sale made .

.

.

" which are fol-

lowed by a list of circumstances in which the statutes are inapplicable. By the plain language of the statutes, then, sales made in good
faith to meet the prices of a competitor are not within the ban of
the act, and any merchant who can bring himself within the exception has not violated its terms, although the effect of his sale
below cost is otherwise prohibited by the statute.
D. Statutes Having No Express Exception
What of the defense in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and South
Carolina, the three states having no express exception for meeting
competition? Logically, the defense is available. The statutes in these
states purport only to prohibit sales below cost when made with the
intent to injure a competitor or destroy competition."' In this case,
the defense is implicit: one who sells below cost for the purpose of
meeting competition probably does not intend to injure his competitors. In Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells,"' the plaintiff brought suit
for treble damages, alleging that the defendant had sold at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor. The district court found that the defendant's
actions had been prompted by the shrinkage of the competitive
market, a decline in the prices set by immediate competitors, pressure from wholesale customers, and a desire to maintain and increase profits. The district court also found that the defendant's
prices were not low in relation to competitive prices for like products and that the defendant had no intent to injure his competitors. The circuit court affirmed the judgment for the defendant,
stating that "one who reduces his prices in defense of his economic
life cannot be guilty of eliminating competition or his competitors.""
The defense, then, in states having no express exception for meeting competition but requiring proof of a specific intent to injure
a competitor or destroy competition, is presented by way of direct
rebuttal to the allegations and not by affirmatively pleading an exception. Therefore, the defense of meeting competition is probably
substantive; that is, proof of the intent in good faith to meet a com"Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17050.
"Conn. Gen. Stat. S 6716 (1949); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 671,
Code 5 66-65 (1952).
4'242 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1957).
4
aId. at 486.

S 2 (1938); S.C.
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petitor's price would negative an intent to injure a competitor or
destroy competition.
It should be noted that the approach outlined above for the three
states mentioned is also available in states which have the express
statutory exception."3 Therefore, a defendant charged with violation
of the act who did not wish to rely solely on this exception could
plead the various factors which prompted his decision to sell below
cost. Logically, he has not violated the statute because he has not
sold below cost with the intent to injure a competitor or destroy
competition. As indicated previously, when proof of the specific
intent is required, the defense should still be substantive." But if a
merchant in an "intent or effect" state pleads outside the statutory
exception, his defense in all likelihood would be procedural only,
since he would have no express statutory exception to rely upon
when confronted with positive evidence that the effect of his sale
below cost was to injure a competitor. His action is condemned as
a matter of law when it has the prohibited effect but for the express
exception. Having pleaded none, the defense logically falls. 5
E. The Oklahoma Statute
As stated earlier, a merchant in the legal-price states may meet
a price which he believes to be legal; in the meeting competition
states and in those states which have no express exception, a merchant presumably may meet any price his competitor sets, so long
as the merchant does not intend to injure a competitor or destroy
competition; and in those states where intent to injure is a necessary
element of the violation, a merchant may plead outside the statute
if he can prove that he had no specific intent to injure a competitor
or destroy competition.'6
The problems are different, however, in Oklahoma, where the
good-faith exception permits
any retailer or wholesaler [to] advertise, offer to sell, or sell merchandise
at a price made in good faith to meet the price of a competitor who is
4 See notes 10 and 11 supra for a list of states having an express exception.
""In fact, pleading outside the exception should give a broader defense than pleading
the exception, since one would not be burdened with the necessity of proving that he
believed in good faith that his competitor's price was legal. But cf. People v. Pay Less
Drug Store, 143 P.2d 762 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943), aff'd, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d
9 (1944); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 322 P.2d 179 (Okla.
1957). The courts in those cases seem to adopt an "either-or" approach--either the defendant is within the statutory exception, or he has acted in violation of the statute. This
approach, of course, cannot be logically harmonized with the language of the statutes.
"'Op. Att'y Gen. of Utah, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1952-1953 Trade Cas.) 1 67410,
at 68079 (Dec. 31, 1952).
" But see note 44 and accompanying text.
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selling the same article or products of comparable quality at cost to
him as a wholesaler or retailer. 7 (Emphasis added.)
As in the legal price states, a merchant in Oklahoma surely can take
advantage of the exception if he believes in good faith that' he is
meeting a competitor who is selling at cost or above."8 And, by pleading outside the statutory exception, a merchant should be able to
meet the price of a competitor selling below cost, if the merchant
has no intent to injure a competitor or destroy competition. The
only Oklahoma case to discuss the matter, however, apparently
held to the contrary. In this case, the supreme court denied the defendant the use of the exception because the defendant thought it
was meeting an illegal price; logically, this denial required that the
decision be based on extrastatutory grounds. Although the court
found that the defendant's "sole purpose" was to meet the price of
its competitors, it enjoined the defendant from selling below cost.'
A defense outside the statute, then, is probably not available in
Oklahoma.
The operation of this exception can best be explained through
analysis of a series of hypothetical examples, since there are no reported decisions discussing it. Assume that the statutory cost of
coffee for both A and B is $1.00 per pound, but that merchant A
sells the coffee for 99t. Merchant B reasonably believes that A is
selling at or above his statutory cost. B may meet the price of A by
selling his coffee at 99 per pound since the fact that A is selling
below statutory cost is immaterial once B has established his goodfaith belief that A is selling at or above cost.5 But suppose that A,
wishing to increase his business by offering a special price on coffee,
sets his price at 90 per pound. Under the Oklahoma exception, B
cannot meet this price; he could not believe in good faith that A was
selling at cost or above because the price differential is too great." In
" Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 598.7 (1951).
4 But cf. the statement of the trial court in Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1955 Trade Cas.) 5 68195, at 70906, 70910 (Okla.
Dist. Ct. Oct. 21, 1955): "The logical presumption . . . would be that the defendant
Safeway should know that something was wrong with the competitor's price. . . . [T]hey
can probably buy as cheap, or cheaper, than anyone else, and should know that there was
something wrong." Apparently, if a chain store, or perhaps a large independent, sells
below cost, it cannot be in good faith, since it has a presumed lower cost. Thus, these
merchants can safely meet a price only when it is in fact at or above the competitor's cost.
4"Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 322 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957).
so This statement assumes, of course, that the merchant is able to get around the presumption discussed in note 48 supra.
" The trial court remarked, "As I understand the Act . . . if-store 'B' . . . has been
able to make a good deal . . . store 'C' would be permitted to meet that competition . .. ."
Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n v. Safeway Stores, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1955
Trade Cas.) 5 68195, at 70906, 70910 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Oct. 21, 1955).
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such an instance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has said that "the
appropriate remedy is by injunction.""
The injunctive remedy suggested by the court may be small consolation, however, for section 598.5 of the statute permits the issuance
of an injunction only when there is a "violation or threatened violation" of the act." Section 598.3 declares a below-cost price illegal
only when set
. . . . with the intent and purpose of inducing the purchase of other
merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or other-

wise injuring a competitor . . . where the result of such . . . sale is to
tend to deceive any purchaser, or to substantially lessen competition,
or to unreasonably restrain trade, or to tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce. 4

This statutory language indicates that obtaining an injunction is not
as simple as the Oklahoma court intimated. As stated earlier, merchant A intends only to build up his own business. This purpose
involves no specific intent to injure competitors or destroy competition. Likewise, only the unfair diversion of trade is deemed contrary
to the act. The issue, then, becomes whether A is guilty of "inducing the purchase of other merchandise." The phrase "or otherwise
injuring a competitor" refers to the language immediately preceding
it in the statute and suggests that "inducing the purchase of other
merchandise" is, as a matter of law, done with the intent to injure
a competitor.5 Despite this implication, a similar "loss-leader" provision was construed by a California court to require the finding
of a specific intent to injure in order to constitute a violation."'
" Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 322 P.2d 179, 181 (Okla.
1957). In this case, the court refused to enjoin Safeway's competitors from giving trading

stamps with sales at statutory cost, since a trading stamp is not a reduction in price, but
a "cash discount." See the section on trading stamps, infra.
"aOkla. Stat. tit. 15, 5 598.5 (1951).
54
Okla. Stat. tit. 15, 5 598.3 (1951).
" However, it may create only a rebuttable presumption. This approach would go far
toward harmonizing the particular language quoted with Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 598.5(c)
(1951), which raises a presumption that any sale below cost is illegal. If this is the case,
then the language quoted has no independent effect.
" Ellis v. Dallas, 113 Cal. App. 2d 234, 248 P.2d 63 (1952). Cal. Bus. and Prof.
Code § 17030 defined a "loss leader" to mean, inter alia, a product sold for the purpose
of inducing, promoting, or encouraging the purchase of other merchandise; § 17044 declared that the "practice of using any article or product as a 'loss leader' is included
among the prohibitions of this chapter." Still, the court held that a loss leader was proscribed only when there was an intent to injure competitors or destroy competition. Subsequent to the decision in the Ellis case, the legislature amended § 17044 to read: "It is
unlawful for any person engaged in business within this State to sell or use any article
or product as a 'loss leader' as defined in Section 17030 of this chapter." (amended by
Star. 1953, ch. 334, § 1). However, a California lower court recently stated that the
amendment of § 17044 did not change the result of the Ellis case. Northern Cal. Food
Dealers v. Farmers Market, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1956 Trade Cas.) 5 68402, at 71723
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Under this approach, whatever its merits, the injunction could not
issue, unless in addition to finding that A sought to "induce the purchase of other merchandise," a court also found that A did so with
the specific intent to injure a competitor. Under the alternative approach, that an intent to "induce the purchase of other merchandise"
is as a matter of law the intent to injure a competitor, the injunction is still only problematical,"' for there is no violation under the
statute unless the requisite intent is accompanied by one of the results enumerated in the statute, viz., deception, the substantial lessening of competition, the unreasonable restraint of trade, or the
tendency to monopoly. Only if one of these be the result or probable result can A be enjoined. It is doubtful if there is any deception
of the purchaser, since he can purchase his coffee for 900 and is
not required to make any other purchases in order to receive this
bargain. Whether any of the other results are present is a question
which could only be answered through analysis of the prevailing
market conditions in the trade area. If A is a small independent grocer with one store, it is difficult to see how his actions would be accompanied by any of the prohibited results; if A is a chain store, or
a large independent, the injunction may well issue. B, therefore, may
be in the anomalous position of being able neither to meet A's price
nor enjoin it.
To take another example: A competes with B; B is a competitor
of C, but C and A are not competitors because they are not in the
same trade area. The statutory cost of coffee to A is $1.00 per pound,
while the statutory cost of coffee to B and C is $1.05. If A sells his
coffee at $1.00, B may match A's price and also sell coffee at $1.00.
C cannot sell at that price; C is B's competitor, not A's, and the exception which permits B to meet A's prices denies C the right to
meet B's prices.
Meeting a competitor's lawful price in Oklahoma is not permitted
when the competitor is selling below his cost, although the statute
in other sections purports to prohibit sales below cost only if made
with intent to injure a competitor."5 Regulation of this sort is of no
value.
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 29, 1956). Apparently, the Ellis case is still the prevailing view in
California.
"7And, if the presumption is only rebuttable, a finding of the specific intent to injure
would be necessary.
"sSafeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 322 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957).
The supreme court enjoined the defendant although it found that the defendant's sole
purpose was to meet its competitors' prices. The defendant was denied the use of the "good
faith" exception because it thought it was meeting illegal prices.

COMMENTS
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III. WHEN PRICES MAY BE MET

A word remains to be said as to when the prices of competitors
may be met. Although the writer could find no authority on this
point, it is believed that the price cannot be met in advance; meeting competition, as an economic concept, is defensive in nature, and

the exception can be relied on only when a merchant can demonstrate that his competitor set the lower price first. Outside of this
qualification, the price can be met anytime after that lower price has
been set." ' After a merchant's competitor has restored his price to

the former level, the exception is no longer available to the mer-

chant."°

IV.

PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION

Many of the statutes limit a merchant to meeting the price or
legal price of a competitor who is selling the "same""' product, others
use the phrase "the same article or products of comparable quality, '"'
and still others have no qualification of this type."3 The qualification
expressed in the first two groups is fairly implied in the last, however, for the terms "meeting a competitor's price" or "meeting a
competitor's legal price" can be fully understood only by reference
to the product on which the competitor has set his lower price." '
Accurate definition of the word "same" or the phrase "same article
or products of comparable quality" is therefore relevant to all three
groups.
There is a paucity of authority on this matter. The three times
the phrase has been construed, either expressly or impliedly, one
court and two attorneys general have opined that a brand name
alone is not determinative of whether goods are the same or of comparable quality." Furthermore, this authority comes from jurisdictions which either employ the word "same" in the statute or have
"Northern Cal. Food Dealers v. Farmers Market, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1956 Trade
Cas.) 5 68402, at 71723 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 21, 1956).
60People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9 (1944).
6" Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
65 Idaho, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
63Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
64""The competition must be in the same or similar goods." Op. Att'y Gen. of Wis.,
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1954 Trade Cas.) 5 67830, at 69697, 69699 (Jan. 25, 1954)
(a state having no express qualification).
"5Ibid.; Op. Att'y Gen. of Minn., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1948-1949 Trade Cas.)
62372, at 62985 (Feb. 14, 1949) (a "same" state). See also People v. Pay Less Drug
Store, 143 P.2d 762 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943), aff'd, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9 (1944).
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no express qualification. On this point, therefore, the interpretation
of the statutes, regardless of form, would seem to be uniform. Yet,
what other factors are pertinent? Should the raw materials used be
considered?"d Is the manufacturing process a criterion? 7 Or is price
the determining factor?"' Is one of these criteria or some combination
of them valid for one product and invalid for another? Further discussion of this problem will assume with a California court that the
word "same" in the statute means "the same or similar,""5 and that
in the absence of an express qualification a merchant under the
statute may meet his competitor's price on the same or similar
products. This approach is best calculated to harmonize this portion
of the statute with its declared purpose to prohibit sales below cost
when made with the intent to injure a competitor or destroy competition. 0
The most important criterion, within statutory limits, should be
whether the goods are substitutes for each other. To illustrate:
suppose a store sells canned spinach, fresh spinach, and frozen
spinach. Are these products all substitutes for each other because
they are all spinach? Or is the market to be appraised in terms of
canned vegetables, fresh vegetables, and frozen vegetables? From
the consumer's standpoint, no satisfactory answer can be given; the
factors governing his choice at one time are not necessarily determinative at another; 7 that is, the consumer may on one occasion want
simply "a vegetable," on another "a frozen vegetable," and on another "some kind of spinach." The interpretation of the statutory
language hinges upon this sort of determination, difficult as it may
61 Cf. U.S. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949); U.S. v. Klearflax
Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
7
" Cf. U.S. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347
U.S. 521 (1954); U.S. v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd,
343 U.S. 444 (1952).
"6Cf. Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit and Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
6 Northern Cal. Food Dealers v. Farmers Market, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1956 Trade
Cas.) 1 68402, at 71723 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 29, 1956).
0 An analogous problem has arisen with respect to the interpretation of the phrase "like
grade and* quality" in the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1952), but one should not fall into the trap of using Robinson-Patman cases as conclusive authority in this area. That act was designed, at least in part, to prevent unfair
discrimination by a seller which would give to his purchaser a competitive advantage at
a resale level, a purpose not present in below cost legislation, which was designed to prevent unfair competition between sellers at the same distributional level. Another difference
is that under the federal act, the plaintiff must prove that the products were of "like
grade and quality" in order for the act to apply, while under below cost legislation, proof
of the similarity of products sold is a part of the defense to a charge of illegal pricing.
See Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the RobinsonPatman Act, 66 Yale L.J. 1, 8 (1956).
71 Cf. the discussion in Samuelson, Economics 476-93 (2d ed. 1951).
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be. The statutory language seemingly contemplates a physical
identity between the products claimed to be competitive, and this is
the normal meaning of the word "same" and the meaning best calculated to insure effective administration of the statutes.
The following test is proposed for determining whether the products are the same or similar:
(1) The products must be physically identical. This requirement is construed broadly enough to encompass differences in processing and manufacturing; that is, canned spinach, fresh spinach,
and frozen spinach are physically identical products.
(2) A change in the price of the physically identical products
in one form must stimulate or retard substantially the demand for
the products in other forms. In other words, there must be a great
cross-elasticity of demand between the products in the various
forms:"5 if a change in the price of product A stimulates or retards substantially the demand for product B, the second test is met."
This test is broad enough to be applied to different brands of identical products (e.g., brand A frozen spinach and brand B frozen
spinach) as well as to different finished forms of the same basic
substance (e.g., frozen spinach and canned spinach). It also permits
a consideration of the variables of quality and quantity. A change
in the price of a twenty ounce can of brand A pears may substantially affect the demand for a twenty-eight ounce can of brand
B pears. If this is so, the statute permits a merchant to meet a price
cut in a twenty ounce can of brand A with a price cut in a twentyeight ounce can of brand B. The suggested approach is, of course,
quite flexible, and allows ample latitude for equitable results in
particular situations.
V.

PRICE DIFFERENTIALS

The issue of price differentials is inextricably bound with the
problem of product differentiation. Quite often, slight differences
in what is essentially the same product will result in the two products' being sold for different prices. A question thus arises as to
the treatment of price differentials under the statutes.
72 See Bain, Pricing, Distribution, and Employment 51 (rev. ed. 1953): "precisely defined, it should be noted that cross-elasticity measures simply the tendency of buyers to
shift from one good to another when the price of the latter changes, regardless of the
ability or disposition of the sellers of the latter to supply them."
" Caution, however, should be used in applying this test. If there are several brands
competing with each other, a change in the price of brand A may effect only a small
change in the demand for each competing brand. In such a case, the test contemplates
measuring the effect of the change in A against the sum total of changes in demand for
all other competing products.
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The simplest case has been discussed by the Attorney General of
Wisconsin."' Chain stores were selling their own bread at 19¢ per
loaf and the bread of local bakers at 25 per loaf. Independent
merchants also sold the local bread at 25 per loaf. The question
posed was whether the independent merchants could sell local bread
at 190 per loaf to meet the competition of the chain store bread.
The Attorney General held that if the local bread for which consumers were willing to pay a higher price were sold at the lower
price, a claim of meeting competition in good faith could not be
sustained.
This approach is sound. Effective competition at the retail level
often exists between similar products sold at different prices."
Courts have declared that state agencies regulating prices may take
into account this price differential when fixing the prices to be
charged for the regulated product." Our task is to determine whether
the sales below cost statutes recognize this economic fact.
The statutes permit a merchant to meet the "price" or "legal
price" of a competitor selling products of comparable quality. This
language does not require that competition take place solely between goods of the same price. As previously noted, the word
"same" is uniformly construed to mean "comparable" with regard
to the brand of the product concerned. The fair inference is that
only similarity, not identity of price, is required by the statutes."
For example: brand A sells at 30 per unit; brand B sells at 270
per unit. If a merchant (assuming he can legally do so) reduces
the price on brand A to 270, his competitor may reduce his price
on brand B to 240 per unit,"8 if the test outlined in the preceding
section of this Comment is met. The more difficult question is
whether brand B can be reduced below the price of 240 per unit.
74Op. Att'y Gen. of Wis., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1954 Trade Cas.) 5 67830, at
69697 (Jan. 25, 1954).
"aSee FTC v. Standard Brands, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951); Minneapolis-Honeywell

Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948).
" Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251

(1936).

This case held,

over claims of unconstitutionality, that the New York Board of Health could order welladvertised brands of milk sold at 10 per quart more than unadvertised brands: "there had
resulted . . . a balance maintained by a price differential. To attempt the maintenance of
that balance was to strive for 'equality of treatment .... ." 297 U.S. at 262.
"[I] f one merchant sells one brand of coffee or salad oil, for instance, at a designated
price, a competitor . . . may lawfully meet that price with other brands of coffee or
salad oil of comparable cost and quality." (Emphasis added.) People v. Pay Less Drug
Store, 143 P.2d 762, 769 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943), aff'd, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9
(1944).

" The burden of proof may be difficult. To establish good faith, a merchant should
be prepared at least to show that a price differential had existed long enough to establish
a competitive equilibrium at the former price levels.
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If this can be done at all, it can probably be done only upon a
showing that the lower price of 240 was not sufficient to re-establish the competitive equilibrium historically existing between the
two products.
The reverse is equally true, as indicated by the Attorney General
in the opinion discussed above. The merchant in the preceding
example who reduced his price on brand A to 27 could hardly
justify his action on the theory that he was meeting competition;
to hold that he was meeting competition in good faith would be
to exalt form over substance because the merchant who sets brand
A at 270 will effectively beat the competition of brand B. The matter was succinctly stated by the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws:
Here a mechanical test would defeat the objective of permitting a
realistic equalization of an actual competitive situation. An inflexible
cent-for-cent rule would enable a seller of the preferred commodity in
fact to undercut the price for a less desirable product, or conversely,
deprive a seller of the less popular product of the full benefit of the
competition" defense. We therefore urge a flexible rule which
regards the nominal price of the rival product as only a presumptive
boundary of a seller's permissible price reduction under the "meeting
competition" proviso, adjustable up or down upon satisfactory proof by
the person questioning its reliability. In practical operation, such a test in
some circumstances necessarily must permit a seller of a less accepted
brand to cut substantially below the more popular product's price ...
In each case, the heart of the matter is whether actual competition,
not merely a nominal price quotation, is realized."'
'meeting

There is another aspect to the problem of price differentials:
may a merchant offset added services of his competitor by a lower
price? Ostensibly, this problem is solved through the cost provisions of the statutes; that is, a merchant who offers no added services will have a lower cost, which presumably will enable him to
set lower prices. But this remedy is more illusory than real. For
example, a merchant selling on credit-a service which may be of
great value to the purchaser-may always lower his price to meet
his cash competitor's price. Further, the practical difficulties of
computing the cost of doing business for a particular item are almost insurmountable. Furthermore, since the writer has found no
79

Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 184 (1955). Situations could be multiplied
ad infinitum. As a practical matter, a merchant will probably prefer to reduce his own
brand selling at the same price as the brand on which his competitor reduced his price;
but the statute does not require this. Cf. Comment, The Meeting Competition Defense
Under Section 2(b), 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 261, 266-67 (1954).
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case in which a merchant attempted to prove that his cost of doing
business was less than what the statute presumed, it seems that
virtually all merchants use the statutory formula in calculating
cost for any single item.
For one Ohio court, the statutory policy of declaring the cost
of doing business the same for all merchants, regardless of the services offered, discriminated against cash-and-carry merchants visa-vis merchants who extended credit, and the entire statute was declared unconstitutional because it destroyed the "natural competitive advantage resulting from lower prices, based upon lower
costs . . . ."" In another case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
expressly rejected this argument of unconstitutionality by declaring
that
sufficient answer is furnished by the act itself in the exemption . . .
of sales made by any merchant "in an endeavor made in good faith
to meet the local [sic] prices of a competitor. . .. "'
It is a fair inference that the Minnesota opinion supports the argument that under the exemption a cash-and-carry merchant can
legally sell below cost in order to offset the added services rendered
by the credit merchant. The policy underlying this argument is
sound. But the writer cannot agree with the Minnesota court that
the cash merchant is statutorily entitled to sell below cost, for the
meeting-competition exception deals with the competitive pricing
of commodities qua commodities and its language will not support
the Minnesota approach.
This does not mean, however, that there is no remedy available
to the cash-and-carry merchant in this situation. Before he has
violated the statue, he must be guilty of selling below cost with
the intent to injure his competitor, or with the effect of injuring
his competitor; thus, he may seek his remedy outside the exception.
But, since the meeting-competition defense does not protect him
in this situation, he must recognize the possibility that his competitor who gives credit will follow him down, price for price.
S Serrer v. Cigarette Serv. Co., 74 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1946), aff'd, 74 N.E.2d
853 (Ohio Ct. App.), aff'd, 148 Ohio St. 519, 76 N.E.2d 91 (1947). Cf. Florida Dry
Cleaning and Laundry Bd. v. Everglades Laundry, 137 Fla. 290, 198 So. 380, 382 (1939):
"There is a distinct difference between delivery and the cash and carry aspect of the
laundry and dry cleaning business. . . . In fixing a schedule of prices, it is the duty of
the Board . . . to take into consideration these elements and establish a differential in
charges between the two methods accordingly."
" Fredricks v. Burnquist, 207 Minn. 590, 292 N.W. 420 (1940). The statute reads
"legal."
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VI. TRADING STAMPS
To date, the courts and attorneys general who have considered
the impact of trading stamps on below cost legislation have uniformly held that a trading stamp is a "cash discount" rather than
a reduction in price." Their rationale runs something like this: A
merchant cannot sell below a certain price; a trading stamp is a
cash discount; a cash discount does not reduce price; ergo, giving
a trading stamp with sales at statutory cost does not reduce the
price below cost. This approach is artificial and demonstrably
erroneous.
One need not quarrel with the terminology, for it makes no
difference what one calls a trading stamp; the result is that the consumer gets a token of value in addition to the article he purchases.
If merchants A and B sell coffee at $1.00 per pound, and A gives
trading stamps with the purchase, the consumer is getting more
for his money, no matter how it is phrased. A court which maintains that the net result to the consumer is the same in both instances is ignoring the facts.
Why do courts follow this line of reasoning? One obvious explanation is their acceptance of the "cash-discount" theory without critical analysis of the legal issues presented."3 Under the cashdiscount theory, intent and effect are immaterial, 4 for if a cash
discount does not reduce price, the transaction takes place outside
the statute. Furthermore, a merchant may not reduce his price by
a value equivalent to that of a trading stamp, for in so doing
he "beats," not "meets," his competitor's price." Thus, a mer-

chant who desires to compete effectively with his competitor who
gives trading stamps must give trading stamps himself."
A closer examination of the cases leaves one with the impression
that underlying the courts' analyses is the thought that trading
stamps are de ninimis. How else explain the statement of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Sperry & Hutchinson v. Margetts: "The
true cash discount of . . . 2% . . . bears no relation to the object
and policy of the law";" or that of the Idaho Attorney General:
R2 Food and Grocery Bureau v. Garfield,
20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942); Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954); Safeway Stores, Inc.
v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 322 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957); cf. Trade Comm'n v.
Bush, 123 Utah 302, 259 P.2d 304 (1953).
" For a full discussion of trading stamp law, see Note, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 242 (1956).
4Food and Grocery Bureau v. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942).
85 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 322 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957).
"8See the note on the Safeway case in 36 Texas L. Rev. 691, 694 (1958): "The rule
of the principal case eliminates (the] . . . most potent weapon, price competition, and
therefore virtually forces retailers to use trading stamps."
8715 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310, 312 (1954). The case arose under a New Jersey statute
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So long as the giving of "trading stamps" is nothing more than a
customary cash discount we seriously doubt . . . that it would con-

stitute a violation of the Unfair Sales Act. But if trading stamps are
given in amounts greater than is customary and with an intent or
having the effect of doing or accomplishing things proscribed . . . it

could amount to a violation."
But there is no de inininfis exception in these statutes. They prohibit sales below cost when accompanied by a prohibited intent or
effect. And at what point do trading stamps cease to be a cash
discount and become a price cut?"
There is evidence in the statutes themselves to demonstrate that
the cash-discount argument is incorrect. Statutory cost at the retail
level may be presented by the following equation:
Statutory cost equals invoice cost"0 plus cartage"' plus taxes 2 plus a
percentage markup" minus trade discounts."'
But a court which determines that a cash discount does not reduce
cost has in reality added another element to the equation so that
it becomes:
Statutory cost equals invoice cost plus cartage plus taxes plus a percentage markup minus trade discounts minus cash discounts.
In essence this latter equation redefines statutory cost and reduces
it to the extent of the discount permitted. This approach subordinates the legal issues to the accounting conclusion, although there
isa clear legislative mandate to the contrary.
It does not follow that the result of the cases discussed above
is wrong insofar as they refused to enjoin the giving of trading
stamps with sales at statutory cost. For purposes of interpretation,
trading stamps should be treated like any other reduction in price
prohibiting the sale of motor fuel at less than cost and further providing that no "rebates, allowances, concessions or benefits shall be given directly or indirectly, so as to
permit any person to obtain motor fuels from a retail dealer below the posted price or at
a net price lower than the posted price applicable at the time of the sale." N.J. Stat. Ann.

56:6-2 (1937).
88Op. Att'y Gen. of Idaho, CCH Trade Reg. Rep.

(1955 Trade Cas.) 5 68100, at
(March 31, 1955).
8"The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that "single"
stamps (one for every 100 purchase) were a cash discount, but then enjoined "double" stamps (one for every 50 purchase). Apparently, "double" stamps were a price cut, although the reason for the injunction does not appear. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 322 P.2d
179 (Okla. 1957).
:0Or replacement cost, whichever is lower.
If, paid for by the retailer.
.2 State and federal.
3 Usually 6%, but ranging up to 12%
in Arizona.
4 Except cash discounts. The cash discount here excepted is, of course, the one which
the retailer gets for paying cash.
70571
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and should be enjoined only when they are given with the intent
or effect of injuring a competitor or destroying competition.
VII. CONCLUSION

The good-faith exception is based largely upon the fiction that
a merchant investigates his competitor's prices before meeting them;
as a practical matter, this is seldom done. Outside of the impracticability or impossibility of determining the legality of the price
being met, there is always the salient fact that in a vigorously
competitive industry, such as the retail grocery industry, prices
change rapidly, and a merchant who is not prepared to meet
his competitor day by day, price for price, is quite likely to be lost
in the shuffle. Therefore, the good-faith test more often than not
is apt to be a hindsight test: if the prices met were legal, and if the
defendant's counsel is able to marshal sufficient economic data,
the merchant has acted in "good faith"; otherwise, he has not.
And as pointed out in the body of this Comment, the presence of
the "good-faith" qualification has led some courts into the fallacy
of adopting an "either-or" approach--either a merchant has acted
"in good faith" or he is enjoined, although there may be no evidence
to show that his sales were accompanied by the proscribed intent,
effect, or result. The language of the exception, therefore, could
be improved if the phrases "good faith" and "legal price" were
removed from the statutes altogether, so that a merchant would
feel free to meet his competitor on a price-for-price basis without
worrying about statutory requirements which are, in reality, superfluous to the determination of that issue. Such an exception could
be phrased to read simply: "The prohibitions of this act do not
apply to a price which meets competition." The exception worded
in this form shifts from a subjective test of "good faith" to an
objective standard of comparing prices, and a merchant has fulfilled
his burden of proof under the exception when he shows either that
his competitor set the same lower price first, or that his price cut
did no more than reassert the historic price differential.
This change alone is not sufficient. Specifically, the statutes make
evidence of sales below cost prima facie evidence of the intent to
injure a competitor or destroy competition. This provision, which
is of doubtful constitutional validity,"5 bears no reasonable relationship to actual market conditions. The motives for selling below
cost are innumerable, but in the face of this obvious fact, legisla"Wiley

v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 151 Me. 400, 120 A.2d 289 (1956).
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tures deem a sale below cost prima facie evidence of the prohibited
intent. The effect of this provision on a meeting-competition exception, whatever its form, is obvious: a merchant who meets his
competitor's price by selling below cost has furnished a potential
adversary with prima facie proof of an unlawful intent. Hence,
the exception could be made more effective by removing this provision altogether.
The exception could also be improved if it explicitly recognized
that cash-and-carry merchants and credit merchants do not stand
on an equal footing. Few people are willing to pay cash when
credit is available at no extra cost. Thus, the exception should
include a clause expressly permitting a cash-and-carry merchant
to sell at a price lower than his credit-giving competitor in order
to offset the extra service furnished.
The question of the impact of trading stamps on below-cost
legislation is just beginning to emerge. As noted earlier, the courts
have not yet clearly perceived the issues involved. A New Jersey
"anticoncession" clause did not prevent the New Jersey Supreme
Court from holding that a trading stamp was a "cash discount"
and not a price cut within the meaning of the statute." If such
attitudes persist, legislatures should be prepared to provide that a
merchant may reduce his prices by a value equivalent to the value
of a trading stamp given by a competitor.

Allen Butler

96See

note 87 supra, where the "anti-concession"

clause is quoted.

